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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-1997
__________
KEITH P. SEQUEIRA,
Petitioner
v.
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Securities and Exchange Commission
(Agency No. SEC-1:3-l7734r)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 11, 2020
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed June 11, 2020)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
Keith P. Sequeira, proceeding pro se, petitions for a review of an order issued by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) upholding the Financial

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Industry Regulatory Authority’s (FINRA) decision to indefinitely suspend him from
associating with any member firm. FINRA imposed the suspension because Sequeira
failed to pay an award to Wells Fargo Advisors that was entered by a FINRA arbitration
panel. For the following reasons, we will affirm.
Sequeira worked for Wells Fargo as a registered broker. In February 2010, Wells
Fargo loaned Sequeira over $47,000 pursuant to a “Client Service and Loyalty AwardLevel One Agreement” and a promissory note. Under the terms of those documents,
Sequeira was obligated to repay the loan if he was terminated. Both the Level One
Agreement and the promissory note contained arbitration clauses stating that “any action
instituted as a result of any controversy arising out of [the Level One Agreement or the
note], or … [the] interpretation thereof shall be brought before the arbitration facility of
[FINRA] to the exclusion of all others.” Wells Fargo terminated Sequeira’s employment
in August 2010. Sequeira failed to repay the loan, and Wells Fargo commenced a
FINRA arbitration action against him. A FINRA arbitration panel awarded Wells Fargo
compensatory damages, plus interest, as well as attorneys’ fees. In the August 5, 2014,
letter notifying Sequeira of the decision, FINRA explained that it could suspend his
registration if he failed to comply with the award.
Sequeira did not pay the award. Instead, he filed in action in the Superior Court of
New Jersey seeking to vacate the arbitration award. But because he failed to properly
serve the summons and complaint on the defendants, the state court dismissed the action
2

without prejudice for lack of prosecution on March 27, 2015. Thereafter, Sequeira
unsuccessfully sought to have the case reinstated.1
Meanwhile, on July 27, 2016, Wells Fargo notified FINRA that Sequeira had not
complied with the award. Shortly thereafter, FINRA’s Office of Dispute Resolution told
Sequeira that, effective August 19, 2016, FINRA would suspend Sequeira from
associating with any FINRA member firm unless he demonstrated that he had (1) paid the
award; (2) entered into a settlement agreement concerning the award; (3) timely filed an
action to vacate or modify the award and that such motion had not been denied; or (4)
filed for bankruptcy and that the award had not been deemed non-dischargeable. In
response, Sequeira argued that he satisfied condition (3) because his action in the
Superior Court had been denied without prejudice, rather than on the merits. A FINRA
hearing officer issued an expedited written decision, rejecting Sequeira’s argument and
ordering that Sequeira be suspended from associating with any member firms until he
paid the award in full, settled the matter, or filed a bankruptcy petition. Sequeira sought

1

In particular, Sequeira moved for an extension of time to file and serve an amended
complaint, but the Superior Court denied his request. Later, the Superior Court denied
Sequeira’s motion to reconsider the denial of the motion for an extension of time, noting
that the case “remains closed.” Undeterred, Sequeira attempted to reinstate the action by
serving his original complaint on Wells Fargo. On September 30, 2016, the Superior
Court concluded that Sequeira failed to provide either good cause or exceptional
circumstances for his failure to prosecute the action, and again stated that the case
“remains closed.” The Superior Court’s orders were affirmed. See Sequeira v. Wells
Fargo Advisors, LLC, Docket No. A-1995-16T1, 2018 WL 3018882 (N.J. Super. Ct.,
App. Div., June 18, 2018).
3

review of that decision by the Commission. See Securities Exchange Act Section 19(d)
[15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)].
The Commission concluded that the specific grounds on which FINRA based
Sequeira’s suspension existed in fact, that the suspension was in accordance with
FINRA’s rules, and that FINRA had applied its rules in a manner consistent with the
Securities Exchange Act.2 See Securities Exchange Act Section 19(f) [15 U.S.C. 78s(f)].
Accordingly, the Commission dismissed Sequeira’s application for review. See In re
Application of Keith Patrick Sequeira for Review of Action Taken by FINRA, Exchange
Act Release No. 85231, 2019 WL 995508, at *9-10 (SEC Mar. 1, 2019). Sequeira
petitions for review of the Commission’s order.
We have jurisdiction to review a final order of the Commission under Section
25(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1). We review the
Commission’s decision to uphold sanctions for abuse of discretion and overturn the
sanction only if “unwarranted in law or … without justification in fact ….” Butz v.
Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., Inc., 411 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1973) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs where (1) a sanction is
“palpably disproportionate to the violation,” or (2) the Commission “fail[s] to support the

2

In an earlier decision, the Commission had remanded the matter to a hearing officer for
clarification whether the sanction imposed was disciplinary or non-disciplinary. The type
of sanction imposed affects the standard of review applied by the Commission.
Thereafter, a FINRA hearing officer issued a second expedited decision clarifying that
the suspension was not intended to be disciplinary in nature, but instead was aimed at
4

sanction chosen with a meaningful statement of findings and conclusions, and the reasons
or basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the
record.” McCarthy v. SEC, 406 F.3d 188 188 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
As noted above, a party who does not comply with an award issued by FINRA
may avoid suspension by demonstrating, inter alia, that he has filed a timely motion to
vacate or modify the award and the motion has not been denied. See FINRA Regulatory
Notice 10-31, 2010 WL 2712571, at *2 (effective July 2, 2010). Sequeira contends that
this defense should have shielded him from suspension because, although the New Jersey
Superior Court dismissed his action to vacate the award, it did so without prejudice,
rather than “on the merits.” Appellant’s Br., 35. The Commission properly rejected this
argument. As the Commission explained, FINRA rules “do not require that a motion to
vacate an arbitration award be denied on the merits. Nor do they distinguish requests to
vacate arbitration awards that are denied ‘with prejudice’ from those that are denied
‘without prejudice.’” See Sequeira, 2019 WL 995508, at *5; see also FINRA Manual,
By-Laws of the Corporation, Art. VI, Sec. 3(b) (stating that FINRA may suspend any
person who fails to comply with an arbitration award “where a timely motion to vacate or
modify [an] award … has been denied”). Moreover, the possibility, however remote, that

“influenc[ing] Sequeira to comply with the arbitration award.”
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Sequeira’s dismissed state court action might be reinstated does not change the fact that
his attempt to vacate the award had been denied.
Sequeira’s remaining claims also lack merit. First, Sequeira argues that FINRA
lacked jurisdiction to compel him to arbitrate his dispute with Wells Fargo because the
arbitration clauses did not notify him that he was waiving his right to sue. The
Commission correctly rejected this argument because an arbitration award cannot be
collaterally attacked by a respondent in a FINRA expedited proceeding. The
Commission had jurisdiction to review only FINRA’s decision to suspend Sequeira based
on his failure to pay the award. Any challenge to the award itself, including a claim that
the arbitration panel lacked jurisdiction, should have been brought “in a court of
competent jurisdiction.” See FINRA Rule 13904(j); Robert Tretiak, Exchange Act
Release No. 47534, 56 S.E.C. 209, 2003 WL 1339182, at *5 (SEC Mar. 19, 2003) (“As
we have stated on numerous occasions, an applicant may not collaterally attack an
arbitration award … in a disciplinary proceeding for failure to pay that award.”).
Second, he asserts that FINRA’s initial decision contained libelous statements.
The Commission properly concluded that the libel allegations were “outside the scope of
this proceeding.” Sequeira, 2019 WL 995508, at *8. The allegedly libelous statements
were made in FINRA’s initial decision, rather than in its decision following the
Commission’s remand. See note 2, supra. Thus, those statements were not part of the
FINRA decision that the Commission reviewed. In addition, the statements had no
6

bearing on whether FINRA’s suspension met the applicable standards under Securities
Exchange Act Section 19(f).
Finally, Sequeira argues that there is no basis for his suspension because Wells
Fargo wrote off the value of the arbitration award in its 2018 tax filings. Sequeira did not
assert that claim during the agency proceedings. Therefore, he is barred from raising it
for the first time here. See Securities Exchange Act Section 25(c)(1) [15 U.S.C.
§ 78y(c)(1)] (“No objection to an order or rule of the Commission, for which review is
sought under this section, may be considered by the court unless it was urged before the
Commission or there was reasonable ground for failure to do so.”).
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Sequeira’s arguments lack merit and
that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Sequeira’s application for
review. Accordingly, we will deny Sequeira’s petition for review of the Commission’s
decision. Sequeira’s motion to supplement the record is denied.

7

